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ABSTRACT: Tristan Haze claims we have made two mistakes in replying to his two 
attempted counter-examples to Tracking Theories of Knowledge.1 Here we respond to 
his two recent claims that we have made mistakes in our reply. We deny both of his 
claims. 
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A. The Oracle Case: 
In his original paper, Haze claimed to have invented two counter-examples to 
tracking theories (though he mainly targeted Nozick). In our reply to Haze, we 
explained why the examples were neither counter-examples to Nozick nor 
Dretske. In the first example, person A (Haze) delusionally thinks person B (his 
neighbor) is an oracle, not a knowledgeable tax lawyer. A dislikes lawyers and 
would not believe B if A knew B were a lawyer. B tells A “p,” a truth about tax 
law. A believes p but also delusionally believes B is an oracle. Haze argues that A 
does not know that p because of the delusion. 
We countered that as long as the delusion does not affect A's ability to 
understand or believe what B says, and as long as B wouldn't say “p” unless p, that 
nothing in tracking theories bars A's knowing that p. The delusion does not affect 
A's coming to know that p.2 With respect to the current interpretation Haze says: 
Firstly, the assumption that they make is right: in the example as I intended it, 
the main delusion I have is that my neighbor is not a lawyer but a divine oracle. I 
was not imagining myself to have delusions concerning the issue of what my 
neighbour has and has not said to me…. It occurs to me that perhaps this 
counterexample should have been more fully specified. If we imagine the origin 
of my belief to have been forgotten by me, so that it becomes mere history, then 
perhaps I could be said to know that p. But as I am imagining it, the stuff about 
my neighbor being a divine oracle is fresh in my mind and I think of it with 
wonder every time I think of p…I do not know what more to say in support of 
                                                                
1 Tristan Haze, “Reply to Adams and Clarke,” Logos & Episteme VII, 2 (2016): 221-225. 
2 We also considered a case where the delusion spreads and does affect A’s belief and does block 
knowledge, but Haze does not reply to that interpretation. 
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my view here, so I will leave it at that and just hope that you agree with me 
about this.3 
Haze claims that A still does not know that p. We still maintain that he 
does. Does it matter that A forgot where he acquired his belief that p is true? It 
could. If someone who did not know that p told him, it would matter. But B 
knows that p. In the “fully specified” emendation Haze insists that A remembers it 
was B who said “p” each time A believes that p. We still do not see why that 
matters, as long as the delusion is not affecting A's ability to think clearly about 
the meanings of tax law p and as long as B knows tax law and is not being 
deceptive in any way. As far as we can tell A is tracking the truth about p and 
knows that p. Haze seems to be throwing himself on the court of public opinion. 
Okay, good. We have presented these ideas at several venues over the past year 
and everyone so far has agreed with us. 
B. The Nutt Case: 
Now lets consider Haze's claim that we make a second mistake in our reply to 
him. Let’s call the neighbor in the example ‘Norman Nutt.’ Haze's second example 
is this: 
My neighbor is a tax lawyer. Here, unlike in the previous counterexample, I have 
no delusional belief. It is my neighbor who is the strange one: for years, he has 
intently nurtured an eccentric plan to get me to believe the truth about whether 
p, where p is a true proposition of tax law, along with five false propositions 
about tax law. His intention to do this is very counterfactually robust. He moves 
in next door to me and slowly wins my trust. One day, he begins to regale me 
with points of tax law. He asserts six propositions: p and five false ones. I believe 
them all.4  
Our reply to Haze's second claim is this: 
We think the reason Haze believes this is a counterexample is because he 
relativizes the method M to the neighbor and the neighbor's dispensing of 
information and not to Haze's own belief-forming methods. Haze seems to think 
the method here is that with respect to the true proposition p, the neighbor 
would not say "p" unless p. This causes Haze to think Nozick's tracking 
conditions are satisfied and that Nozick's theory implies that Haze knows that p. 
However, this is not the case. (…) Nozick is very clear that methods are the 
belief-forming methods of the cognizer. (…) Haze's method M in the example is 
to trust what the neighbor says…. And this method clearly does not track the 
truth because it is not restricted to "p" alone, but freely ranges over the other five 
                                                                
3 Haze, “Reply to Adams and Clarke,” 223. 
4 Haze, “Two New Counterexamples,” 310. 
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falsehoods the neighbor utters and Haze believes. So this too, when properly 
understood, does not constitute a counterexample to Nozick's tracking theory.5   
Haze's new reply to us is this: 
I agree that the method M in the example is to trust what the neighbor says – 
that is exactly how I thought of it when I came up with the counterexample. I do 
think the tracking conditions are satisfied, but not because I have some idea of 
what the method M is which differs from Adams and Clarke's idea of what the 
method M is…. The first thing to note about this argument is that it does not 
refer explicitly to any of Nozick's four conditions for knowledge-via-a-method. 
Nowhere do Adams and Clarke specify, by engaging explicitly with Nozick's 
theory as formulated in four conditions, why this example, according to them, 
fails to count as knowledge on that theory….The second thing to note is that 
Nozick's account nowhere requires that the method M in question in a given case 
track the truth, where tracking the truth is something like general reliability. I 
agree that, in this example, the method in question – trusting what my neighbor 
says – is not generally reliable. But that doesn't stop Nozick's conditions from 
being fulfilled, for the conditions do not require general reliability of method.6  
Again, we fail to see the problem. Haze agrees that the method is “trusting 
what the neighbor says.” The neighbor, ‘Norman Nutt,’ says five false things and 
one true.  Hence, condition three states: “If p weren’t true, and Haze were to use 
the method of trusting what his neighbor, Norman Nutt, says to arrive at a belief 
as to whether  (or not) p, Haze would not believe, via the method of trusting what 
Nutt says, that p.” Nutt harbors some deep, irrational propensity to lie to Haze 
about matters of law. Accordingly, it is entirely possible that if p weren’t true, it 
might be the case that Nutt tells Haze that p is true. Thus, it’s plausible that the 
proposition in question is false, and that Nozick’s account is therefore correct in 
implying that Haze fails to acquire knowledge that p. Haze, however, contends 
that the proposition in question is true:  
…if p weren’t true, and I were to use the method of trusting what my neighbor 
says to arrive at a belief as to where (or not) p, I would not believe, via the 
method of trusting what my neighbor says, that p. As I stipulated in describing 
the counterexample, my neighbor’s desire to have me believe the truth about p is 
very counterfactually robust.7   
This method does not track the truth. Obviously! The crux of the problem is 
that it seems intuitively likely that if p weren’t true, it might not be the case that 
Nutt speaks the truth regarding p! We are not sure what more we need to say. 
                                                                
5 Adams and Clarke, “Two Non-Counterexamples,” 69. 
6 Haze, “Reply to Adams and Clarke,” 224-225. 
7 Haze, “Reply to Adams and Clarke,” 225. 
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Contrary to Haze’s claim that we have unjustifiably imported reliability 
requirements into Nozick’s account, the reliability of the method for arriving at a 
belief is an intrinsic feature of the account, for the truth of the relevant 
counterfactual conditional is grounded in nomic relationships rather than in mere 
probabilistic correlations or in single-case realizations. Since the reliability 
involved in the account is complete, nomically grounded reliability, it is 
unaffected by the generality problems that plague probabilistic accounts like 
Goldman’s reliable process theory. 
Haze says that we are going rogue, and not staying true to Nozick's 
conditions. But as every constitutional lawyer knows, the letter of the law does 
not cover every application to every case. Some interpretation is required. 
Nozick's theory does not anticipate Haze's attempted counterexamples. But it is 
not hard to figure out how to apply the theory to the example and it goes as we 
suggest. This is not a matter of giving a new theory, but of interpreting the 
existing one. We can't help but note that Haze's original paper offered putative 
counter-examples to “tracking theories,” not just to Nozick. We explained why 
they were not counterexamples to Nozick or Dretske. Haze did not accuse us of 
giving a different account than Dretske's – and for good reason. We provide an 
interpretation of how tracking theories must respond to the examples he raises in 
order to stay consistent with the intended interpretation of the conditions of the 
theories. 
It is perhaps true that the general method “believing what the neighbor 
says” need not be tracking the truth for every possible thing the neighbor might 
say. But according to tracking theories of knowledge (Nozick's and Dretske's), if 
one is to know something about tax law from a tax lawyer, it had better be the 
case that the tax lawyer would not say “p” about tax law unless p. Since this is not 
the case for Haze's neighbor in example two, tracking theories say that Haze does 
not know that p. And we are not changing anything about tracking theories. The 
counterfactual, “the neighbor wouldn't say ‘p’ unless p,” is not true. It is right 
there in Nozick's condition 3 as relativized to the method Haze agrees he 
intended.8 To conclude, we think that Haze is mistaken about both the Oracle 
Case and the Nutt Case: the first case does constitute knowledge while the second 
does not. 
                                                                
8 Many thanks to John A. Barker for comments on this paper. 
